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2Abstract
Medical malpractice insurance “crises” seem to recur with distressing frequency. Indeed, 
the escalating costs of malpractice insurance premiums have become the focal point for 
advocates of tort reform. While we know quite a bit about the medical malpractice system, we 
know very little about what might work to fix things. Many reforms have been tried; little has 
worked. The two most commonly attempted reforms – at least at present- are legislatively 
imposed caps on non-economic damages (i.e., pain and suffering) and the use of screening 
panels. Neither of these alternatives offers a satisfactory resolution to the problem.
This article proposes the use of voluntary caps, selected (if at all) by the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff’s attorney. By the use of three separate litigation “tracks,” incentives can be provided 
for plaintiffs to agree to caps on damages, while also providing separate inducements for the 
insurers who defend malpractice defendants and the physicians that they insure. The underlying 
benefit for all would be substantially reduced costs of litigation. The end result would be 
improved access to the courts for injured plaintiffs and a more rational claims resolution system.
Legislation implementing the proposal would not be necessary; tailored discovery 
scheduling orders would suffice. In a politically charged climate, broad scale, equitable reform is 
not likely. Instead, we should begin a steady movement towards such reform, in stages. We need 
to learn to crawl, before we can walk. 
3Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases   
I. Introduction
Again we find ourselves in a medical malpractice crisis.1 Observers who follow such 
things generally agree that the crisis of the early 2000s is the third such crisis in recent memory. 
The first appeared in the mid 1970s; the second appeared in the mid 1980s.2 The crisis is, by and 
large, about the level of malpractice insurance premiums physicians pay. Rates have increased 
substantially in the last several years over most of the country, and the rates have increased for 
all medical and surgical specialties. Several surgical specialties, including Ob-Gyn and 
orthopedic surgery, have experienced particularly dramatic rate increases.3 Beyond the attention 
paid to rising insurance premiums is the fear that for at least some specialties in some states, 
malpractice insurance is, or will soon become, unavailable.4 From a concern over rising 
insurance rates and diminishing availability of insurance, the next worry – one of access to health 
care- comes naturally. Will escalating premiums lead a substantial number of physicians – Ob-
1
 Some writers prefer to place “crisis” in quotes, suggesting that the problem is a bit overstated. Certainly there is no 
shortage of overblown rhetoric in the continuing debate over medical malpractice reform. It is the position of this 
article that the quotation marks are irrelevant. What matters is that the situation is widely perceived as a crisis, 
certainly by physicians and politicians, as well as many others. A perception this widespread simply can’t be 
ignored. 
2
 See, generally, David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 N.ENG. J. MED. 283, 284-5 (2004)(hereinafter 
Studdert et al., 2004a); William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in 
GOSFIELD, ed., HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 2003.  See also American Medical Association, Medical Liability 
Reform- NOW! at 2 (2004)(available at www.ama-assn.org/go/mlrnow, site visited December 23, 2004) (hereinafter 
American Medical Association 2004); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the 
Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFFAIRS, January 21, 2004. 
3
 Thorpe, supra n. 2, at 21. See also General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors 
Have Contributed to Premium Rate Increases, at 9-13, 31, GAO-03-702 (2003) (hereinafter GAO, Multiple 
Factors), William P. Gunnar, Is There An Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice Premiums? 13 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 465,  470-1 (2004).
4
 See, e.g., John Wagner, Malpractice Pinch Has Maryland Doctors Mulling Whether to Wait or Leave, 
WASHINGTON POST, B1, November 30, 2004; Sheri Hall, Malpractice Rates Drive Off Doctors, DETROIT 
NEWS, A1, October 25, 2004; Tanya Albert, Two Illinois Towns Take Tort Reform Into Their Own Hands, 
AMEDNEWS.COM, August 9, 2004; Rachel Zimmerman and Christopher Oster, Assigning Liability: Insurers’ 
Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice ‘Crisis’, WALL STREET JOURNAL, A1, June 24, 2002; American Medical 
Association, supra n.2 at 4, 9-10. 
4Gyns are almost always used in this sort of argument- to abandon the practice of medicine?5
More precisely, will escalating premiums, or the difficulty in obtaining insurance, induce a 
substantial number of physicians practicing in, say, Pennsylvania or New York or North 
Carolina6 to move to states with lower malpractice premiums? Although it may have been an 
answer, twenty-five or thirty years ago, for physicians to simply pass along the increased cost of 
insurance premiums by increasing the fees they charge, that option is much less realistic today. 
In a health care system dominated by managed care, it has become increasingly difficult for 
physicians to simply pass along their higher costs.7  Nor is it an answer to say to a physician, 
much as one might to a 23 year old driver, that you must simply be more careful, and eventually 
your rates will come down. Unlike drivers, physicians within a particular specialty are usually 
not “experience-rated.” 8
Politicians and editorial writers around the country have all weighed in with their views 
about what ought to be done.9  Inevitably, proposals for tort reform have appeared, at both the 
federal and state levels.10 None of this is new, of course. It all happened in the mid 1970s, and, to 
5
 See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, News Release, Medical Liability Survey Reaffirms
More Ob-Gyns Are Quitting Obstetrics, July 16, 2004, www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr07-
16-04.cfm (site visited November 29, 2004); Kathleen Kerr, Docs Don’t See Future in Babies; Long Island 
Obstetricians Seek Support for Legislative Reform of Malpractice Insurance System, NEWSDAY, A6, October 19, 
2004.
6
 Three of the twenty states placed on the “crisis” list maintained by the AMA. See www.ama-assn.org (site visited 
December 23, 2004).
7
 Studdert et al. 2004a, supra note 2, at 286; Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: 
Physician Satisfaction and Quality of Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS 23:4, 41, at 47 (2004) (hereinafter Mello et al. 
2004); Sage, supra n.2, at 20.
8
 Michelle M. Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice 
Reform,  80 TEX. L.REV. 1595, 1616 (2002) (hereinafter Mello and Brennan 2002); PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 76-77 (1991) (hereinafter WEILER 1991). There is some indication, however, that the 
long-standing of practice of charging one premium for all physicians practicing in the same specialty, such as 
general surgeons, or Ob-Gyns, is changing. See David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What 
Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It? 80 TEX. L.REV. 1639, 1645 at n.18 (2002).  
9
 See, e.g., John P. McDaniel, Triage for a Crisis in Care, WASHINGTON POST, November 21, 2004 (editorial); 
Jack Torry, Bush Slams Malpractice Lawsuits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, A1, October 23, 2004; Bob Herbert, 
Malpractice Myths, NEW YORK TIMES, June 21, 2004 (editorial). 
10
 Several states (Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and West Virginia) enacted cap legislation in 
2003 and 2004, limiting the amount of non-economic damages a medical malpractice plaintiff may recover, along 
5an extent, the mid 1980s. The fact that a third crisis appeared in the early 2000s speaks volumes 
about the effectiveness of the various proposals and reforms adopted in the past. 
To this picture must be added another factor, hardly surprising in itself, but one that 
should not be overlooked. Physicians have little use for the tort liability system as it operates in 
the United States. One need only skim the AMA’s website11 for a quick sense of this. Physicians 
consistently over-estimate their chances of being sued.12 In a recent randomized survey of 
Pennsylvania medical specialists, 80% of the respondents characterized their malpractice 
insurance premiums as either an “extreme burden” or a “major burden.”13 But beyond the 
obvious fact that doctors distrust the tort system in this country, there is a more basic concern. 
Physicians as a group doubt the ability of any finder of fact- be it judge, jury, or lawyer- to 
determine whether their conduct- their diagnosis, their treatment, their care in general- was 
negligent.14 In fact, it goes deeper than this. Many physicians are offended by the very idea that a 
non-physician might pass judgment as to their medical decisions.15 It is not enough to 
acknowledge that “physicians are upset” and then concentrate one’s efforts solely on the 
economic aspects of the problem. There is more to it than that. For any “reform” to have any 
with various other changes. In contrast, in 2004 voters in Oregon and Wyoming defeated ballot initiatives to impose 
caps on non-economic damages. Meanwhile, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment limiting attorneys’ 
fees in medical malpractice cases. See Tanya Albert, State Tort Reform Ballot Wins Set Stage For Further 
Battles,AMEDNEWS.COM, November 22, 2004. At the federal level, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 
4280, the Health Act, in May 2004. One of the key features of the bill was the imposition of a cap on non-economic 
damages. The Senate, to date, has not approved the bill. 
11
 www.ama-assn.org.
12
 Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J. Health, Politics, Policy and Law 
463, 475 (1992).
13
 Mello et al. 2004, supra n.7, at 48.
14
 Ralph Peeples et al., Settlement Has Many Faces: Physicians, Attorneys, and Medical Malpractice, 41 J. 
HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 333, 342-43 (2000) (hereinafter Peeples et al. 2000); PAUL WEILER, A 
MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE (1993) (hereinafter WEILER 1993a), at 126-129; Catherine T. Struve, Expertise 
in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Special Courts, Screening Panels, and Other Options, at 7 (2003) (hereinafter 
Struve), available at www. Medliabilitypa.org/research/struve1003.
15
 Timothy Marjoribanks et al., Physicians’ Discourse on Malpractice and the Meaning of Medical Malpractice, 37 
J. Health & Social Behavior 163, 167 (1996); Struve, supra n. 14, at 16.
6chance of long-term success, the concerns of physicians- as well as their patients- must be 
acknowledged and addressed.
II. What We Know
It is a paradox that while we actually know quite a bit about medical malpractice, we 
know very little about what might work to fix it. More so than most other types of personal 
injury torts, medical malpractice has consistently attracted scholarly attention. Of equal 
importance, this scholarly attention has often taken the form of empirical studies, based on actual 
observation, as opposed to case and statutory analysis, or mere theoretical discourse. Thus we 
know that most incidents of medical negligence never form the basis for a claim against the 
physician, the hospital, or the insurer, much less a civil lawsuit.16 Every study on the subject 
leads to the same conclusion: much more medical negligence takes place than most people 
think.17 On the other hand, a large number of ill-founded claims of medical negligence are made 
every year, as well.18 Thus, the problem is one of both under-inclusion and over-inclusion.
When lawsuits are filed, the evidence strongly suggests that the tort liability system does 
a good job of identifying meritorious cases (i.e., those cases involving negligence on the part of 
the physician), although the identifying and the compensating is typically done in a very 
inefficient and costly way.19 Almost all empirical studies have found that compensation is related 
to a determination of negligence on the part of the defendant physician. Thus, Danzon examined 
16
 PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19-29 (1985) (hereinafter DANZON 1985) (California 
data); WEILER 1993a, at 137-39 (New York State data, as part of the Harvard Medical Practice Study); David M. 
Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and 
Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L.REV. 1643, 1675, 1682 (2000)(hereinafter 
Studdert et al. 2000).  See, generally, the summary provided in Patricia Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, 
in CULYER AND NEWHOUSE, eds., HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339, 1351-55 (2000) 
(hereinafter Danzon 2000).
17
 This was one of the key points made by the Institute of Medicine report in 2000. See  INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (1999)(Kohn, Corrigan and 
Donaldson, eds.). See also Mello and Brennan 2002, supra n.8, at 1599-1603; Hyman, supra n. 8 at 1643 (2002).
18
 WEILER 1993a, supra n.14 at 71.
19
 Studdert et al. 2004a, supra  n. 2 at 285. 
7malpractice claims closed by California insurers in 1974 and 1976, and concluded that in 
general, the malpractice liability system operated in a rational way. Meritorious claims were 
more likely to be paid than non-meritorious claims.20 Cheney, et al. reviewed closed insurance 
company claims relating to anesthesiologists and found a clear connection between negligence 
and compensation.21 Looking at over 8000 closed insurance files from New Jersey, and 
examining the assessments of physician reviewers in those cases, Taragin et al. also found that 
claims were much more likely to be paid if the physician reviewers felt the defendant doctor’s 
conduct had fallen short of the relevant standard of care.22 Farber and White reported similar 
findings, after a review of medical hospital records relating to 242 malpractice lawsuits,23 as did 
Sloan et al. following a study of obstetrics and emergency malpractice claims in Florida.24
Indeed, only one study- although probably the one most often cited- did not find a connection 
between medical negligence and compensation. That study, which was based on a review of 
approximately 57 hospital records, instead found only a connection between severity of injury 
and compensation.25 The connection between negligence and compensation can be shown not 
only in insurance company practice (paying only claims deemed meritorious, on the opinion of 
expert physician reviews)26 but also with the ultimate arbiter in this area- the lay jury.27
20
 DANZON 1985, supra n. 16 at 50. 
21
 Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599, 1601 (1989).   
22
 Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992).
23
 Henry Farber and Michelle White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical 
Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994). 
24
 FRANK A. SLOAN et al., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 170-75 (1993) (hereinafter SLOAN et al. 
1993); Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice 
Claim, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 413 (1995); Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical 
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair? 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997,1025-27 (1990). 
25
 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1965 (1996). The authors subsequently acknowledged the singularity of 
their findings. See Studdert et al. 2000, supra n.16, at 1654.
26
 Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 
WAKE FOREST L.REV 877, 883-85 (2002) (hereinafter Peeples et al., 2002). 
8It appears that lay juries do “get it right” most of the time- their lack of medical training 
notwithstanding. 
Most medical malpractice lawsuits never reach trial, although the trial rate for medical 
malpractice cases is consistently higher than the trial rate for other civil lawsuits.28 The most 
common disposition is settlement. Approximately half of all medical malpractice lawsuits are 
settled prior to verdict.29 Unilateral abandonment of the case by the plaintiff- i.e., a voluntary 
dismissal, not involving the payment of money- is also quite common.30 When a medical 
malpractice case does go to trial, the defendant physician prevails most of the time- a result 
which recurs in the literature. 31 While a number of explanations for this pattern at trial are 
possible (e.g., general jury bias in favor of physicians, better expert witnesses, or greater defense 
resources) the most likely reason is more basic. Insurers settle cases they believe they will lose. 
They try only those cases they believe they can win.32 The insurer’s assessment is usually borne 
out at trial. Thus, in a real sense, a plaintiff who takes her medical malpractice case all the way to 
trial has already lost: if she has been unsuccessful in coaxing a settlement from the insurer, the 
27
 Taragin et al., supra n. 22; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective,
40 ARIZ. L.REV. 849, 859 (1998).
28
 Vidmar, supra n. 27, at 851; Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations 
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L.REV. 319, 364 (1991); Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving 
Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury’s Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 49 (1991).
29
 SLOAN et al. 1993, supra note 24 at 167; DANZON 1985, supra n. 16 at 32, 42; Peeples et al 2002, supra n. 26 
at 881.   
30
 SLOAN et al. 1993, supra note 24 at 176; DANZON 1985, supra n.16, at 42.
31
 Studdert et al.2004a, supra n. 2, at 285.The reported rates vary according to the sample studied, but the results 
uniformly indicate a success rate in excess of 50% for defendant physicians, and usually significantly higher than 
that. For example, Jury Verdict Research reported that defendant physicians prevailed 58% of the time in 2002. JVR 
News Release, April 1, 2004, at www. juryverdictresearch.com (visited October 16, 2004). Weiler has estimated a 
defense win rate of 67%, Paul Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L.REV. 908, 914 (1993) 
(hereinafter Weiler 1993b). Sloan and Hsieh reported a rate of about 75% (Florida). Sloan and Hsieh 1990, supra n. 
24 at 1007. A recent study of California verdicts by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice reported a defense win rate 
of about 78%, as compared to a 47% defense win rate for all other trials during the same period. Nicholas Pace et 
al., Capping Non-Economic Awards in Medical Malpractice Trials, RAND Institute for Civil Justice (2004) 19 
(hereinafter Pace et al. 2004). Metzloff reported a rate of 81% (North Carolina). Metzloff, supra n. 28 at 50. For the 
years 1985-1998, the Physician Insurers Association of America (the PIAA) reported a defense “win” rate at trial of 
81%. Physician Insurers Association of America, Medical Malpractice Claim Expenses 2 (1999) (hereinafter 
“PIAA”). See also Gross and Syverud, supra n. 28 at 362-67.
32
 Peeples et al.2002, supra n. 26, at 889, 891.
9chances are excellent that she will be unsuccessful with the jury as well. Her attorney has also 
lost, most likely. Medical malpractice cases are always taken on a contingency basis. The 
percentages may vary (between 20 and 50%, with 33 1/3 % being the most common)33 but the 
basic truth does not change: the plaintiff’s lawyer is paid only if money is recovered from the 
defendant’s insurer.
 Medical malpractice is in effect a specialty practice, although more so on the defense 
side than on the plaintiffs’ side. Defense lawyers are retained and paid by the malpractice 
insurer.34  The insurer typically uses a relatively small number of lawyers to represent its 
insureds.35 As a result, defense lawyers are usually highly experienced “repeat players.”36
Defense lawyers are usually paid on an hourly basis, although various incentive agreements are 
occasionally used. In exchange for the assurance of a certain volume of work, defense lawyers 
often agree to a discount from their standard hourly rate.   
Any lawyer admitted to practice can be a malpractice plaintiff’s lawyer. All that is 
needed is a willing client. Thus, the level of sophistication among plaintiffs’ lawyers varies from 
the inexperienced to the well seasoned. The costs involved in bringing a medical malpractice 
lawsuit are substantial. Medical records must be read and reviewed. The initial reviewing must 
be done by someone with a medical background of some sort- either by in-house staff, or by a 
paid consultant. Physicians who treated the plaintiff, other than the defendant(s), often will need 
33
 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DePAUL L.REV. 
267, 285 (1998) (hereinafter Kritzer 1998a); SLOAN et al.1993, supra n. 24, at 77.
34
 Gunnar, supra n.3 at 479-80; Peeples et al.2002, supra n. 26, at 880.
35
 Peeples et al.2002, supra n. 26, at 880.
36
 Marc Galanter, Why the”Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95, 114 (1974). See also Joel Grossman et al., Do The “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?” 33 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 803 (1999); Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L.REV.1, 53 (1996).
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to be identified and interviewed.  Expert witnesses37 must be identified and retained- and they, 
too, will need to review the medical records. Usually at least several depositions will be 
necessary: that of the defendant(s), and at least the key defense experts. Depositions of other 
witnesses, such as subsequent treating physicians or members of the defendant’s office staff, are
not uncommon. Furthermore, the defense will almost always depose the plaintiff as well as the 
plaintiff’s experts. Most observers estimate the cost of preparing a medical malpractice case at a 
minimum of $50,000. Depending on the complexity of the case, the pretrial costs can easily run 
much higher.38 If the case actually goes to trial, substantial additional expenses must be added to 
the total cost. The high entry cost of medical malpractice lawsuits thus means that in practice, 
damages of at least $100,000 must be involved, in order to make bringing the case 
“worthwhile.”39
It is an expensive business, with high risks for the plaintiff’s lawyer. Not only is there the
risk of never being paid for the time expended; it is often the case that the plaintiff’s lawyer 
advances the costs of pre-trial preparation, with little expectation of recovering those funds, 
unless money is obtained from the defendant either in settlement or at trial.40 It is not surprising, 
37
 Expert testimony from other physicians is a fixture of most medical malpractice litigation. Expert witnesses are 
used to testify as to the relevant standard of care to which the defendant physician should be held, and, to a lesser 
extent, as to causation of the alleged injury. See, generally, William Meadow, Operationalizing the Standard of 
Medical Care: Uses and Limitations of Epidemiology to Guide Expert Testimony in Medical NegligenceAllegations,
37 WAKE FOREST L.REV. 675, 676 (2002); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: 
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 163 (2001).  
38
 See, e.g., Richie Kemp, When Attorneys Come Back for Seconds: Increased Attorney Fees for Extraordinary 
Work in Medical Malpractice Cases, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 79 , 89-90 (2004) (“between $50,000 and $100,000 to 
prepare and litigate the average medical malpractice action”); Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (“the cost of mounting a plausible malpractice claim is at least $50,000”); see also Gail B. 
Agrawal and Mark A. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 
47 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 235, 247 (2003); Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the 
Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L.REV. 1781, 1798 (2002).
39
 Schwartz, supra n. 38, at 1071; Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 
U.ILL.L.REV. 885, 895; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY, 61(1995) 
(hereinafter VIDMAR 1995). Almost twenty years ago, a GAO report estimated the damages threshold at $50,000. 
General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: A Framework for Action, GAO/HRD-87-73 at 23 (1987).
40
 Kritzer 1998a, supra n. 33, at 270; Daniels and Martin, supra n. 38, at 1812; Kemp, supra n. 38, at 89-90.
11
then, that there are lawyers who specialize in medical malpractice litigation. Because of the 
pervasiveness of the contingent fee, their success is largely a function of the cases they handle.41
Their ability to attract good cases, due to their own reputation, as well as their ability to obtain 
referrals from other attorneys are of obvious importance.42 Ultimately, however, the success of a 
plaintiff’s medical malpractice lawyer is a function of his or her case-picking ability.43 A case of 
likely liability, but involving only limited recovery (such as a case where appendicitis was 
diagnosed later than it should have been, but the patient suffered little or no permanent harm) 
may not be worth pursuing. The amount of time and money needed to prepare the case, 
compared to the amount that can be recovered, will make it unlikely that an experienced 
plaintiff’s lawyer would want to take the case. A case of very uncertain liability, but involving 
potentially high damages, might offer some allure, but unless there is a reasonable chance of a 
large recovery, an experienced attorney will likely decline to take that case as well. After all, 
one-third of zero is still zero. In fact, specialist plaintiff’s attorneys can be compared to portfolio 
managers.44 Some cases will yield a recovery, and some will not; certainty of outcome is never a 
part of the plaintiff’s lawyer’s practice. The key is to pick cases that offer a range of recoveries, 
both in terms of dollar value and likelihood of success. In short, the plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
succeed are the ones who are adept at picking good cases. However, there is also a catch: 
because of the possible effect of a plaintiff’s lawyer’s reputation, a case in the hands of a well-
known and respected attorney may be worth much more than the same case in the hands of a 
novice attorney. 
41
 Studdert et al.2004a, supra n.2, at 284; Daniels and Martin, supra n. 38, at 1823. 
42
 Daniels and Martin, supra n.38, at 1793-94; SLOAN et al.1993, supra n.24, at 75-76.
43
 See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 739, 754, 
772-73 (2002) (hereinafter Kritzer 2002).
44
 Kritzer 2002, supra n. 43 at 754; see also Neil Vidmar and Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical 
Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 MISS. C.L.REV. 9, 
32 (2002).
12
The claims resolution process, especially when a lawsuit is filed, is usually slow and 
expensive for all involved.45 A very high percentage- in excess of 55%- of premium dollars are 
used to pay the “overhead” of attorneys’ fees, expert reviews, and trial- preparation expenses, to 
say nothing of the amount of money spent by the insurer internally.46 As a means of 
compensating injured patients, the claims resolution process is grievously inefficient for all 
concerned.47
For all that we do know about medical malpractice, some questions remain unanswered. 
Only limited reliable data is available, for example, on the typical allocation (if there is such a 
thing) in a jury award between economic and non-economic damages.48 In many states, jurors 
are simply not instructed to make such a determination: damages are just damages. In states 
where jurors are instructed to make an allocation between economic and non-economic damages 
(for purposes of complying with a statutory cap on damages, or otherwise) data has not been 
rigorously collected and analyzed until quite recently. For the most part, those efforts have been 
limited to a single state- California.49 It follows, then, that even less information is available 
about economic and non-economic damages, when cases are settled. Compounding the problem 
is the fact that confidentiality is a condition of many negotiated settlements.50
45
 Sage, supra n. 2 at 29; Daniels and Martin, supra n. 38, at 1798; Weiler 1993b, supra n. 31 at 916.   
46
 Studdert et al. 2004a, supra n.2 at 285-86; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L.REV. 1499, 1502-03 
(1991). The high level of overhead is not unique to medical malpractice claims. A study conducted by Tillinghast-
TowersPerrin in 2003 concluded  that less than 50% of premium dollars goes to compensate injured people. 
Tillinaghast-TowersPerrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2003 Update, at 17.
47
 Hyman, supra n.8, at 1644; Weiler 1993b, supra n.31 at 926.  
48
 Extrapolating from the data derived from the Harvard Medical Practice Study (and as reported by WEILER 1991, 
supra n. 8, Sugarman estimated that only 10-15% of malpractice premium dollars actually goes to compensate for 
out-of-pocket economic losses. Sugarman, supra n.46, at 1503. 
49
 See, e.g., Nicholas Pace et al.2004, supra n.31.
50
 Nonetheless, confidentiality can not always be assured. For example, New Jersey now requires the on-line public 
posting of payments made by insurers on behalf of physicians in medical malpractice cases. See N.J.S.A. §45:9-
22.23. See Mary P. Gallagher, Online Posting of Med-Mal Payouts is Seen as Chilling Settlements, NEW JERSEY 
LAW JOURNAL, November 17, 2004.  
13
We also do not know much about experts. Is it true that two are better than one, and that 
four are better than two? Is it important to have more experts than the other side? Are in-state 
experts better than out-of-state experts? Many lawyers assume they know the answers to these 
questions- but few assumptions about the use of experts have ever been tested empirically. 
Credible studies are not easy to find.51 There is reason to believe, however, that experts drawn 
from the same specialty will frequently disagree with one another, even when reviewing the 
same medical records.52
III. The Problem
Knowing all this about the claims resolution process, why is it that crises seem to occur 
with such annoying frequency? One answer, advanced by critics of the insurance industry, is to 
blame the problem on the insurance companies.53 When income from the investment of premium 
revenues is robust, insurers price their policies aggressively, in an effort to expand market share; 
when income from investment of premium revenue declines (and losses from claims begin to 
increase) the industry increases the rates it charges, and blames the increase on the spiraling level 
of indemnity payments made to claimants and their attorneys.54 Another answer is to argue that, 
in fact, the amount of money paid out in claims and in the defense of those claims has been rising 
dramatically; and so, rate increases are inevitable.55 It is a debate that generates more heat than 
light. Simple answers are not to be expected. It seems unlikely that a single cause for the 
51
 See, however, VIDMAR 1995, supra n.39 at 72-76 for a useful discussion of the role expert witnesses play in 
medical malpractice litigation; see also Neil Vidmar and Shari Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence,  66 
BROOKLYN L.REV. 1121 (2001).
52
 K.L. Posner et al., Variation in Expert Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1049-
1054 (1996).
53
 See, e.g., Zimmerman and Oster, supra n. 4; J. Robert Hunter and Joanne Doroshow, Premium Deceit (1999), 
available at www.centerjd.org/PremiumDeceit/%20.pdf.
54
 See Americans for Insurance Reform, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable Losses/Unstable Rates 2004, 
available at www.insurance-reform.org.  
55
 See, e.g., American Medical Association, supra n. 2 at 2-4 (2004). 
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problem exists. Instead, a combination of factors, including a steady increase in claims severity56
and a drop in insurance industry investment income over the past several years seems to be at 
fault.57 What seems true, regardless of the cause of the crisis, is that few people are well served 
by the existing system: certainly not patients or physicians, and perhaps not plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
defense lawyers, or insurers. Most victims of medical negligence never seek redress- either by 
filing a claim, or by filing a lawsuit.58 Thus, most injuries go uncompensated. Physicians are 
caught in the middle. Either they are being manipulated by their insurers, or they are being 
manipulated by dissatisfied patients and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Plaintiffs’ lawyers typically find 
themselves vilified as rapacious opportunists, while defense counsel are seen as a necessary (but 
still regrettable) evil.  
The point here is not that medical malpractice law as it is practiced today fails because 
the premiums doctors have to pay are too high, or because doctors do not trust the tort liability 
system. Those two observations are symptoms of a larger failing. Judged by either of the two 
fundamental goals of modern tort law- deterrence and compensation59- the medical malpractice 
system is a failure, for most of the people, most of the time. 
There are many reasons to believe that as a system of deterrence, medical malpractice 
law does not work. For deterrence to work, a wrongful behavior must be identified, and a 
punishment must be imposed. In order to alter his or her behavior, the wrongdoer must know 
what it was he or she did wrong- and must know what the consequences will be of behaving 
wrongfully in the future. While doctors who are sued for malpractice usually know what it is 
they are alleged to have done wrong, it is not often the case that they agree with the ultimate 
56
 “Claims severity” refers to the amount of compensation demanded and/or  recovered by a claimant.
57
 Thorpe, supra n.2, at 21; GAO Multiple Factors, supra n.3, at 43-45. 
58
 See text accompanying notes 16-17, supra.
59
 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§10, 11 at 17-19(2000); W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 5th ed. §4 at 20-26 (1984). 
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determination of liability, if such an adverse determination is made. 60 It does not matter if the 
adverse determination is made by a jury at trial or by the physician’s own insurer who chooses to 
settle the case. At bottom is the conviction that no layman has the training or insight to judge a 
physician’s medical decisions or behavior.61 Even if the jury actually gets it “right” that 
fundamental conviction remains. There is some irony to this: one of the key ways that an insurer 
will make a determination about liability is to send the relevant complaint and medical records to 
other physicians practicing in the same specialty for review. Only when the consensus of the 
outside reviewers indicates a serious problem, will an insurer seek a settlement.62 Thus, peer 
review does routinely happen- except that it’s usually anonymous and almost never involves 
direct communication between reviewer and reviewed. Beyond these behavioral observations, 
there is the fact that when compensation is paid, it is paid by the insurer. Rarely is any portion of
an award or settlement actually paid by the physician.63 It should come as no surprise, then, that 
efforts to identify a meaningful deterrence effect produced by the malpractice liability system 
have not been successful.64
Judged against the goal of compensation- where only meritorious claims would be paid; 
and where the amounts paid would bear a consistent, logical connection to the type of injury 
sustained – the medical malpractice system fails badly. There are problems of erroneous 
compensation (paying the wrong claimants); of erroneous non-compensation (not paying patients 
injured by medical negligence); of overpayment; and of underpayment.
60
 Peeples et al. 2000, supra n.14, at 341-42.
61
 Vidmar, supra n. 27, at 858. See also notes 14-15, supra.
62
 Peeples et al.2002, supra n.26, at 886. 
63
 Although deductibles are not commonly used in medical malpractice insurance, it is possible that one or more 
adverse events might induce an insurer to either refuse to renew coverage, or require a higher premium in the future. 
This rarely happens in practice, however.
64
 Mello and Brennan 2002, supra n.8, at 1607-9; Hyman, supra n.8, at 1644.
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Erroneous compensation.
Not all claimants who receive compensation deserve it. This concern can be heard 
anywhere personal injury claims are defended; it is not unique to medical malpractice. There is 
substantial empirical evidence that indicates erroneous compensation is not uncommon in 
medical malpractice cases.65  Nonetheless, the incidence of successful “false” claiming does not 
seem excessive. What does not seem to happen very often are strictly “nuisance” payments. Most 
professional liability insurers insist on a showing of at least potential liability before payment 
will be discussed.66
Erroneous non-compensation.
Several major studies within the past twenty years indicate that the incidence of medical 
negligence far exceeds the rate at which injured patients claim compensation for such injuries. 
Most victims of medical negligence never assert a claim, much less file a lawsuit. One obvious 
reason for this is the high entry costs of medical malpractice litigation.67
Beyond these concerns of simply paying the right cases, there is also the problem of the 
close case. Not all cases are clear cut on the issue of negligence. Experts often disagree, simply 
as to what the standard of care requires.68 Given the fact that experts are hired either by the 
plaintiff or the defendant, this should not be surprising.
 An additional problem is the simple fact that the claims resolution process is an 
adversarial system. Factors other than medical negligence can influence the outcome- such as the 
65
 See, e.g., Cheney et al., supra n.21, at 1601 (in 42% of cases studied, payment made even though care provided 
was deemed within the standard of care); Taragin et al., supra n. 22, at 781 (compensation paid in  21% of cases 
deemed defensible by the insurer); Brennan et al, supra n. 25, at 1965-66 (compensation is predicted by severity of 
injury, not medical negligence).      
66
 For example, as reported by the Physicians’ Insurers’ Association of America (the PIAA), in 2002 almost 70% of 
all claims filed against physicians were closed without any payment. See American Medical Association, supra n.2, 
at 2-3; Peeples et al. (2002), supra n.26 at 886.
67
 See the authorities cited at notes 16-17, supra; see also text accompanying notes 38-39, supra.  
68
 See Peeples et al.2002, supra n.26, at 884; K.L. Posner et al., supra n. 52. 
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disparate skill levels of the attorneys, the polish of one party’s experts, the relative attractiveness 
of the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the makeup of the jury.69
Under and Overpayment.
Compensation is not a simple “yes or no” proposition. A $5000 payment in settlement of 
a claim for a permanent, debilitating injury is unlikely to represent adequate compensation, just 
as a payment of $500,000 for a simple delay in the diagnosis of appendicitis is likely to represent 
over-compensation. Although “lottery” type awards are not unheard of (and are invariably 
widely publicized), most research suggests that at least in medical malpractice, claimants are 
typically under-compensated.70
The problems of erroneous compensation, non-compensation, and over and 
underpayment can also be seen easily enough in other areas of personal injury litigation.71
Claiming rates may vary by type of injury (e.g., automobile vs. hospital), but the problems of 
erroneous compensation and erroneous non-compensation are not unique to medical malpractice 
litigation. The puzzle of damages- how they should be calculated; what factors should be 
included, and who should do the calculating- is a problem common throughout tort law.72
Ultimately, a claimant’s damages are whatever amount, if any, the jury awards, or that he or she 
is willing to accept in settlement. It is a land populated by rules of thumb and multipliers but few 
if any guidelines. Even one of the more well-known “rules of thumb”- that total damages should 
equal some multiple (often either two or three) of “special” (i.e., economic) damages does not 
69
 This phenomenon- that factors other than the existence of medical fault can influence outcomes- has been 
occasionally noted in the literature, but seldom studied. See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra n.25, at 1966; SLOAN et al. 
1993, supra n.24, at 183-85. 
70
 Sage, supra n.2, at 29; SLOAN et al. 1993, supra n.24, at 206-7; Weiler 1993b, supra n.31, at 918.
71
 See, e.g., the discussion in SLOAN et al.1993, supra n.24, at 187-188.
72
 See, e.g., Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 54, 55 (2004) (hereinafter Studdert et al 2004b).  
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seem to be borne out in practice.73  Indeed, plaintiffs’ lawyers themselves often disagree on what 
a case is worth.74 In an off-the-rack world, damage awards defy uniformity. Medical malpractice 
awards are no exception.75
Medical malpractice litigation points up another failure of the goal of compensation, 
however. Medical malpractice claims, once they become lawsuits, are almost always expensive 
for both sides.76 Expressed in premium dollar terms, most researchers estimate that 40% of every 
premium dollar is spent on litigation-related expenses, primarily legal fees. Of this percentage, 
about half can be attributed to plaintiffs’ lawyers and about half to defense counsel. 77 In addition 
to the predictable legal fees and the usual discovery costs that will be incurred, both plaintiff and 
defendant will have to spend money on experts. It is rare that a claim or a defense can be made 
without the use of expert testimony, as to standard of care and as to causation. State law rarely 
imposes any limitations on the number of experts that may be identified for possible use at 
73
 Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and 
Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 817-18 (1998) (hereinafter 
Kritzer 1998b).
74
 Two of the more famous studies are by Douglas Rosenthal, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE 
(1974) and Gerald Williams, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983). See the discussion in Kritzer 
1998b, supra n.73, at 817. 
75
 A number of researchers, reviewing jury verdicts, have noted serious “horizontal equity” problems: compensation 
for the same or similar injury can vary greatly, from claimant to claimant. See, e.g., Sloan and Hsieh 1990, supra 
n.24, at 1026; Studdert, et al. 2004b, supra n.72, at 56. See also Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based 
Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L.REV. 1365, 1369 (1989).
76
 A 2003 Report prepared by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated the average cost of 
defending claims that settled in 2001 was $39, 819 (using data provided by the PIAA, the Physician Insurers 
Association of America). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, Reforming the Medical Litigation System to Improve the Quality of Health Care at 12 
(2003). A previous report prepared by HHS estimated the average cost of defense, for all claims, settled or not, at 
$24,000. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Confronting the New Health Care Crisis: Improving 
Health Care Quality and Lowering Costs by Fixing Our Medical Liability System at 8 (2002), available at 
aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.htm. The largest insurer of physicians in North Carolina, Medical Mutual 
Insurance Company of North Carolina, has reported an average defense cost per claim of $22,544, for 1848 claims 
filed, since 1976 to 2003. David Sousa, NC Medical Malpractice Insurance Data v. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys: Can Fact 
Prevail Over Fiction? 64 NC MED J 182, 185 (2003).  
77
 Danzon 2000, supra n.16, at 1369; WEILER 1991, supra n.8 at 53, 192 n.28. A study conducted by Tillinghast-
TowersPerrin, examining tort costs in general estimated defense costs at 14% of the total amount. Tillinghast-
TowersPerrin, supra n.46, at 17.
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trial.78 As a result, “more is better” often dominates each side’s case preparation. In this 
particular arms race, however, the defense has the advantage. It remains true that recruiting 
defense experts, particularly those who practice within the state, is much easier than recruiting 
plaintiff’s experts.79 Regardless of who retains them, the services of experts do not come cheap. 
Hourly rates of several hundred dollars for reviewing medical records or testifying at deposition 
are common. Even higher rates for trial testimony are also quite common.80
In short, the malpractice liability system does a poor job of compensating injured 
patients, and it requires a high level of overhead to operate. There is little reason to think that the 
goal of deterrence is any better served. It is a woefully inefficient system badly in need of repair.
IV. What Has Been Tried
Certainly many kinds of fixes  have been tried. Even more have been proposed, and not 
tried. The more frequently tried reforms have included the imposition of statutory limits on the 
amount of damages that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff (“caps”); the use of pre-suit or 
pre-trial screening panels (mandatory and voluntary); abolition or modification of the “collateral 
source rule;”81 a  requirement that prior to filing suit, the plaintiff’s attorney certify in some way 
that he or she has consulted with a medical expert who will support the allegations of the 
78
 Virginia is a notable exception. See VA. CODE ANN. §8-01.581.20(C). (Each party limited to using no more 
than two experts per medical discipline, on any issue presented.)
79
 In addition, there is the perceived threat of professional sanctions being invoked against physicians who testify in 
favor of plaintiffs. To date, the threat is more perceived than real. However, there are recent instances of 
professional discipline being imposed on physicians who testify for plaintiffs (on the grounds that their testimony is 
at odds with the prevailing standard of care). See, e.g., Austin v. American Ass’n. of Neurological Surgeons, 253 
F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001)(opinion by Posner, J.); Fred Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. 
LEGAL MED. 185 (2004); Theresa DiPaola et al., Silence of the Experts, 40 TRIAL 20 (Oct. 2004).
80
 Ten years ago, Vidmar estimated typical expert witness fees as ranging between $300 and $500 per hour. 
VIDMAR 1995,  supra n. 39, at 60, 74. Vidmar’s estimates were based on his observations of North Carolina cases. 
Following extensive conversations with both plaintiff’s and defense lawyers in North Carolina in 2004, I believe the 
“going rate” for expert review and testimony has at least doubled since that time.
81
 The collateral source rule excludes from the jury’s consideration the existence of other sources of insurance or 
other compensation (such as medical insurance, or workers’ compensation) available to the injured party. 
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complaint; and various types of ADR, primarily arbitration and mediation.82 Heightened
regulation of malpractice (and other) insurers has also been occasionally tried.
There are, of course, other proposals that have never been tried, at least not on a serious 
scale. The most prominent of these include various no-fault proposals,83 in which the emphasis 
would be on compensation in the presence of an undesirable outcome due to medical 
intervention, rather than in the presence of medical negligence. Various changes directed at the 
judicial system itself have also been proposed, including the creation of a specialty court which 
would hear and determine only cases alleging medical malpractice;84 or a resort to special juries, 
in which the jury pool would be limited to those with medical degrees;85 or an administrative, 
fault-based system that would replace the trial court.86  Like no-fault, these ideas have attracted 
few adherents outside the academy.
Of the various reforms that have actually been tried, the two most sweeping in their 
potential effect are the imposition of damage caps and the use of screening panels. The history of 
both these reforms has been checkered. In a number of states, these reforms have been declared 
unconstitutional by the courts.87 Furthermore, assessing the success of these reforms has proved 
difficult for at least two distinct reasons. First, no two states have done it exactly the same way. 
82
 See, generally, the compilation provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures, at
www.ncsl.org/programs/insur/medliability.pdf. (visited December 23, 2004).
83
 See, e.g., Mello and Brennan 2002, supra n.8, at 1626-27; David Studdert and Troyen Brennan, No-Fault 
Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217 (2001); Randall R. 
Bovbjerg and Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U.CIN.L.REV. 53 (1998); 
Weiler 1993b, supra n.31; Jeffrey O’Connell, Offers That Can’t Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims 
By Defendants’ Prompt Tender of Claimants’ Net Economic Losses, 77 NW. U. L.REV. 589, 615-16 (1982).
84
 See Struve, supra n 14, at 68-70; Lindsay Fortado, States Weigh ‘Med-Mal’ Courts, NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL, December 13, 2004; Philip K. Howard, The Best Course if Treatment, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 
21, 2003 (Op-Ed) at A15. 
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 Alan Feigenbaum, Note: Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 
CARDOZO L.REV. 1361 (2003).
86
 Johnson et al., supra n.75.
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 Courts in Alabama, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas and Washington have at 
various times found damage caps unconstitutional. See, e.g., American Medical Association, supra n.2, at 36-38; see 
also Gunnar, supra n.3, at 486. Courts in Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have at various 
times found screening panels unconstitutional. See Struve, supra n.14, at 56-57.   
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In states that have imposed caps, there is considerable variation as to the amount of the cap, and 
as to what sort of damages, exactly, are subject to the cap.88 Similar problems await when one 
attempts to measure the success (or lack thereof) of screening panels. Some are mandatory, some 
are not. Some are physician dominated, some are not. Panel findings are admissible at trial in 
some states, inadmissible in others.89
The second reason why assessing what works and what doesn’t work is the problem of 
compounding factors. If a state adopts more than one reform, and insurance rates stabilize, to 
which reform should the credit (if any) be given? If rates do not stabilize, to which reform should
the blame be directed? Further, factors outside the control of the legislature have an influence on 
rates: the level of insurance losses sustained in the past year, the prime rate, and market 
performance are just a few possibilities.90
Caps on Damages
Caps come in many different styles and flavors.91 Approximately half the states impose 
caps of some sort in medical malpractice cases.92 Most of those states simply place a dollar limit 
on the amount of non-economic damages (i.e., pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental 
anguish) that may be recovered. Several states, however, limit the overall amount that may be 
88
  See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Medical Liability Laws Table, at 
www.ncsl.org/programs/insur/medliability.pdf (site visited December 23, 2004).  
89
 See Jean Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 
58 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 181, 193(1990).
90
 Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effect of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167, 168 (1990); Thorpe, supra n.2, at 21-24. See also United States General Accounting 
Office, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care, GAO-03-836 at 37 
(2003).  
91
 Limits on punitive damages can be thought of as a type of cap, as well. Many states restrict the amount of punitive 
damages that may be awarded, in one fashion or another. Punitive damages, however, are rarely an issue in medical 
malpractice cases. See Pace et al., supra n.31, at 59-60 (punitive damages awarded in less than 1% of the medical 
malpractice trials  in California ending in a plaintiff’s verdict).
92
 See Studdert 2004b, supra n. 72, at 54. See also American Medical Association,  supra n.2, at 24. 
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recovered.93 In some states, caps on damages are accompanied by limits on the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees.94
In their present incarnation, there are several significant problems with the use of caps. 
First, there is the fact that not all injuries are alike, and not all plaintiffs are alike. Caps have the 
effect of imposing a limit on the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover- regardless of how 
grievously he or she has been injured. This remains true even when attention is limited to non-
economic caps. The fact that the “cap” if set high enough may only occasionally come into play 
merely lessens the problem: a limit has been imposed, and in at least some cases, that limit will 
mean that an injured party is less than fully compensated. There is, in other words, an inherent 
arbitrariness to caps.95 The impact of caps does not seem to be limited to a small number of 
plaintiffs. A recent study of California medical malpractice verdicts found that the $250,000 cap 
on non-economic damages was imposed to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery 51% of the time.96 A 
similar study by the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice reported that the $250,000 cap
was imposed 45% of the time.97
As the severity of the claimant’s injury increases, the chances increase that the cap will limit 
his or her recovery. On this point the available empirical evidence is consistent. Non-economic 
caps work to the special detriment of severely injured claimants who can show relatively little in 
93
 States with caps on total damages (economic and non-economic) include Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, and Virginia. See American Medical Association, supra n.2, at 25.
94
 California’s statute, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §3333.1-.2, 
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and 15% of any amount awarded over $600,000. In 2004, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment 
restricting attorneys’ fees in medical malpractice cases as well. See FL. CONST. ART. I §26.  
95
  See Studdert et al. 2004b, supra n.72, at 63; Maxwell Mehlman, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis: 
Fairness Considerations, The Project on Medical Liability in Pennsylvania, 69-70 (2003),www. 
medliability.pa.org/research/mehlman0603/MehlmanReport.pdf, site visited October 31, 2004.
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 Studdert et al. 2004b, supra n.72, at 57. Studdert’s team collected jury verdict data for the period 1985-2002.  
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 Pace et al., supra n.31, at 21. The RAND study reviewed California verdicts from 1995-1999. Both the Studdert et 
al. study and the RAND study relied on data supplied by California Jury Verdicts Weekly. Because it is likely that 
smaller verdicts were under-reported, the actual percentage of “capped cases” may be somewhat less than 45%. See 
the discussion of this issue in Pace et al. at 63-64.  
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the way of economic losses. Typical examples would include cases involving deafness, 
disfigurement, or chronic pain.98 Many wrongful death cases, and cases involving infants less 
than one year old also seem to be disproportionately affected by such caps.99 Unless we are 
willing to say that no injury, no matter how grievous, is worth, say, more than $250,000 for pain 
and suffering, a cap has the effect of penalizing those who are most seriously injured by 
another’s negligence.  
Imposition of a cap also has the effect of exacerbating a disparity widely known in 
personal injury litigation: some lives are worth more than others. The same injury, sustained by 
two different people, can lead to very different recoveries. If non-economic damages are limited, 
then economic damages matter more. Thus, a 30 year old highly compensated stockbroker, now 
permanently disabled, will have economic damages (calculated on the basis of lost future 
earnings) far in excess of the economic damages sustained by a 30 year stay-at-home parent. In 
the absence of caps, non-economic damages can nonetheless be awarded to acknowledge that the 
pain and suffering of both the stockbroker and the stay at home parent are substantial. The 
stockbroker, due to his or her documented lost earnings, may still recover more than the stay at 
home parent; but the stay at home parent’s recovery, already limited by the absence of significant 
economic damages, will not be limited a second time – unless caps are imposed. By exacerbating 
this sort of disparity, the use of caps has the secondary effect of further limiting access to the 
courts. Given the same sort of injury to two different people, one profitably employed and the 
other a stay at home parent, the odds are good that the latter will have a much more difficult time 
than the former finding a lawyer to represent her. In most parts of the country, a case capped at 
98
 Studdert et al. 2004b, supra n.72, at 62.
99
 Pace et al., supra n.31, at 23-30.
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$250,000 (if liability is established), with little in the way of economic damages, will not be a 
very attractive case for experienced attorneys to take.100
The second problem with caps is less theoretical. Legislation imposing caps has met with 
an uneven fate around the country. Efforts to implement caps on a national basis have, to date, 
been unsuccessful. At the state level, some courts have upheld the use of caps, and others have 
not.101 In the states where caps have been found to be unconstitutional, there is of course an 
additional option. The cap can be made a part of the state constitution.102 In the end, whether 
caps are constitutional or not seems besides the point. The amount of time it takes to resolve the 
question makes the value of the exercise doubtful, if what is needed is prompt change.
A third problem has to do with the law of unintended consequences. To what extent does 
the imposition of a cap on some types of injuries, and on some types of damages, distort personal 
injury litigation in general? If medical malpractice recoveries are capped, then an incentive arises 
to recast lawsuits originally styled as malpractice as something else- medical products liability 
claims, perhaps, or claims based on lack of informed consent- or to find new defendants to sue 
who are not protected under the terms of the cap legislation in question.103
Fourth, it is not at all clear that mandatory caps have worked. While there is solid 
evidence that caps do seem to reduce or at least restrain claim severity by limiting total jury 
100
 Studdert et al.2004b, supra n.72, at 63; Pace et al., supra n.31, at xxviii. It also appears that the imposition of 
non-economic caps has a greater impact on women, than on men. The RAND researchers found that the median 
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awards,104 it is less clear that caps have a meaningful or lasting effect on malpractice insurance 
premiums. Thus, Zuckerman et al. in a 1990 study reported that “hard”caps (i.e., dollar 
limitations on all damages, both economic and non-economic) reduced premiums.105 In a more 
recent study, Thorpe found that premiums in states with caps on damages were, on average, 
17.1% lower than in states without caps on damages.106 Nonetheless, the evidence is less than 
compelling.107 Many factors affect malpractice insurance premiums. Some of those factors have 
little relation to tort reforms in general, or caps on non-economic damage awards in particular.108
There is also the fact that the existence of caps does not necessarily insure against the appearance
(or re-occurrence) of a crisis. In 2004 the AMA identified twenty states as “medical liability 
crisis states.”109 Eight of the crisis states (40%) had non-economic damage caps in place at the 
time,110 although in six of those states, damage caps were less than two years old.111 Of the thirty 
states not listed as being in crisis, nineteen (63%) had adopted cap legislation of some sort; 
eleven states (and the District of Columbia) had not.112 The point seems to be that the imposition 
of caps lessens the chances of a “crisis,” but does not guarantee against it.    
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There is one last aspect to the use of caps that, though perhaps obvious, needs to be 
acknowledged. Caps are popular with doctors, insurers, and with many defense lawyers. Caps 
are not popular with plaintiffs, and with plaintiffs’ lawyers. Any proposal to implement caps in a 
given state is certain to draw both strong support and strong opposition. In the event that caps are 
adopted by a given state, it is reasonable to expect constitutional challenges shortly thereafter-
leaving the efficacy of the “reform” in doubt until the challenges are resolved, one way or the 
other. The point is simply this: when caps are proposed, there will be clear winners and clear 
losers, depending on the ultimate fate of the cap proposal.    
Screening Panels
The story with respect to screening panels is also less than clear. The principle is
 certainly appealing. Medical malpractice liability turns on whether the relevant standard of care 
was met or not.113 To determine this, the expert testimony of other physicians is almost always 
required.114 Given this need for expert testimony, a pre-suit or pre-trial determination by a 
neutral panel, consisting of physicians and others, might have the effect of filtering out cases in 
which liability is unlikely to be shown. If all goes well for the defense, a public trial is avoided, 
and the defendant doctor is vindicated. Meanwhile, the plaintiff and his or her attorney have at 
least been spared the greater expense and delay of a full-blown trial- or they have at least been 
warned about the weakness of the case. If all does not go well for the defense, the plaintiff will 
know that pursuit of the claim is worthwhile. The defense will be on notice that a settlement may 
be worth pursuing.115 As originally conceived, screening panels were intended to make the 
claims resolution process work more efficiently, by encouraging the settlement of meritorious 
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cases, and by identifying non-meritorious cases at an early stage.116 The track record of screening 
panels has not borne out this sort of promise, however. At one time, more than thirty states used 
some sort of screening panel. Today, due to judicial challenges and legislative repeals, that 
number is down to twenty.117 A principal shortcoming has been increased delay in the claims 
resolution process. 118
The empirical studies have also been less than kind. Danzon found that screening panels 
had virtually no effect on medical malpractice litigation.119 Zuckerman et al. likewise found that 
panels had no effect on the severity of paid claims, and had little effect on malpractice insurance
premiums.120 Goldman, examining the performance of peer assessments by physicians, found a 
surprisingly low level of consistency with respect to their medical conclusions. Because 
physician participation is an essential part of all screening panels, this finding casts doubt on the 
reliability of the conclusions reached by panelists regarding liability.121 In sum, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that screening panels offer little in the way of malpractice reform.
V. A Simple Proposal 
Thirty years after the “first” malpractice insurance crisis, promising solutions remain 
elusive. It may be that the reforms of the past have been too ambitious. Perhaps we have tried to 
do too much, too quickly. We now find ourselves in a position where, it seems, any reform 
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significant enough to make a difference will necessarily produce clear winners and losers. The 
likely result is political impasse; the inevitable result is resentment all around. It is precisely this 
zero-sum aspect of the debate that makes a resolution difficult. With so much seemingly at stake, 
there is little reason not to simply adopt an entrenched position, and stay there. Any significant 
proposal will face an uncertain fate. 
There is no reason for plaintiffs, and their attorneys, to favor the imposition of caps. 
There is, likewise, no reason for physicians, and their insurers, not to favor them. Maybe 
imposing caps will work, after all. Even if caps fail to have the desired effect, there will still be 
other benefits. Caps on damages have the effect of limiting the potential size of the fee a 
plaintiff’s attorney can earn, from a given case. This is true whether the cap is applied to all 
damages, or only to non-economic damages. Thus, even if malpractice rates continue to rise, at 
least the plaintiff’s malpractice bar will have been chastened. At a minimum, the economic 
incentive for bringing a malpractice lawsuit will have been curtailed. When limits are also 
imposed on the percentage of the recovery the plaintiff’s lawyer is entitled to (typically referred 
to as “sliding scale” fees) the effect is even more pronounced.122
Why not change the incentives? Perhaps it is possible to give everyone a little something.
It should be possible to give physicians and their insurers what they want- caps on non-economic 
damages- but in a way that makes the concession palatable to plaintiffs and their attorneys. At 
one level, this idea is nothing more elaborate than simple horse trading. It may be, though, that 
more is at stake. 
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Within bounds, the malpractice insurance system works well for many- but not all- of the 
key players. The insurer collects premiums from its insured physicians, invests the money, and 
uses the proceeds to defend (and occasionally indemnify) its insureds. In return, the insurer 
expects to make at least a modest profit. The insured physicians, in exchange for their premium 
payments, are assured that in the event of a lawsuit, a defense will be provided. If an indemnity 
has to be paid, the insurer will see to it. Defense lawyers are paid out of the premiums, or the 
income generated by the premiums. So too are plaintiffs’ lawyers and plaintiff patients, when 
successful. It is an organic system in miniature, where the premium payments function as the 
life-blood. When only one of the key players is being shortchanged, the system can still function. 
When more than one key player is being shortchanged, “crisis” results. As the size of indemnity 
payments rises, so does the overall cost of defense.123 The premiums needed to fund the system 
must also increase- but only to a point. Where that point lies depends on one’s perspective, but it 
does exist. Beyond that point, more and more physicians stop buying insurance, or move to 
another jurisdiction, or stop practicing medicine. The result is less money generated from 
premiums to fund the system.
It is silly to think that increased costs of defense can be addressed simply by injecting 
more money into the system. Raising premiums and “passing the costs along” is no longer 
possible, if it ever was.124 Instead, the distribution of the money that flows through the 
malpractice claims resolution system needs to be re-adjusted. By adjusting the distribution 
patterns, the overall level of money expended on the claims resolution system can be controlled. 
At the same time, the system as it now exists could be improved for all concerned. This could be 
done by setting up a system of separate “tracks” for medical malpractice cases. The plaintiff 
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alone would choose the track to use, determined by the amount of damages he or she plans to 
seek. The management of the case would differ, depending on the “track” chosen. 
For example, three tracks could be made available: track one, for cases designated by 
plaintiff’s counsel as involving $200,000 or less in damages; track two, for cases designated by 
plaintiff’s counsel as involving $1,000,000 or less in damages; and  track three, for all other 
cases- where there would be no limit imposed on damages. Choosing either track one or track 
two would thus set a limit on the maximum amount of damages potentially payable to the 
plaintiff. The key point would be that the limits would be agreed to, rather than imposed. The 
idea would be to provide plaintiff with strong incentives for choosing the appropriate track. To 
avoid needless costs associated with bargaining, participating insurers would commit themselves 
in advance to proceed under track one or track two, for any case, if the plaintiff so elects. In 
outline, such a system might look like this:125
Track One. In cases designated by plaintiff’s counsel as involving $200,000 or less in 
damages, each side would be limited to designating just one expert to testify at trial. Depositions 
would not be permitted. Instead, each party would be required to submit a detailed statement of 
their expert’s opinion. The expert’s testimony at trial would be limited to the content of the 
statement submitted. Aggressive discovery scheduling orders would be used, as a way of 
reaching trial or other resolution in less than nine months. Use of mediation would be voluntary, 
available only if both parties requested it.126 Track one, in other words, would be a no-frills 
alternative, in which costs are kept to a minimum. 
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Track Two.  In cases designated by plaintiff’s counsel as involving $1,000,000 or less in 
damages, each side would be limited to designating no more than two experts per specialty. 
Deposition of those experts would be permitted. Aggressive discovery scheduling orders would 
also be a key feature of this track. The goal would be to reach trial or other resolution in twelve 
months or less. Mediation prior to trial would be required. The mediator would be drawn from a 
panel of mediators with experience in medical malpractice litigation.
Track Three.  For all other cases, the plaintiff’s counsel would not be required to indicate 
any limitation on the amount of damages to be sought. Pretrial discovery and case preparation 
would proceed as they do at present. However, the benefits of the other two tracks would not be 
available, either. There would be no limitation on the number or use of experts, and there would 
be no assurance of a prompt resolution of the case. Table 1 below compares the features of the 
three proposed tracks.
TABLE 1
Feature Track One Track Two Track Three
Limits on the number 
of experts
         One Two per specialty                 None 
Deposition of experts 
allowed?
No- written statement 
only
           Yes           Yes
Time to trial Nine months or less Twelve months or less Whenever scheduled 
by the court
Mediation required?          No Yes- mediator to have 
a background in 
medical malpractice
Yes, if required under 
existing law
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Why Do It?
Not every medical malpractice case requires a full-blown entourage of experts proferred 
by the plaintiff and the defendant. Not every case is complex. Some cases that appear complex 
need not be. Yet the amounts expended on case prosecution and defense do not reflect this. Most 
malpractice cases are expensive to prosecute or defend, without regard to the particular issues 
involved, and without regard to the amount of money involved.127 A key reason why almost all 
malpractice cases are so expensive has to do with the fixed costs of medical record review and 
the almost inevitable use of experts. In their study of civil trials in California, Gross and Syverud 
found that medical malpractice trials typically involve more expert testimony than all other types 
of tort litigation, with the exception of products liability cases. For trials conducted in 1990-91, 
the authors reported an average of 5.5 experts per medical malpractice trial.128 This is often just 
the visible part of the iceberg. For every expert who testifies, it is likely that more than that 
number were consulted or retained. For at least every expert who testifies (and for some who 
never do) it is likely that they have been deposed, with the attendant expenses of deposition: 
travel expenses, expert preparation time, attorney time, and stenographic services.
The current claims resolution system provides little incentive to control costs. The 
threshold amounts of $200,000 for track one and $1,000,000 for track two are intended to sort 
cases by complexity- using the amount of money sought as a rough proxy for complexity. To a 
lesser extent, a three track system would also sort cases by the level of severity of the alleged 
injury. 
The threshold amounts are meant to include all damages, economic and non-economic, as 
well as attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiffs ought to be able to decide which track to use, in light 
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of their own assessment of damages. The sorts of classifications and distinctions required by a 
cap on just one sort of damage add needless complexity and argument. If the cap is expressed in 
terms of non-economic damages, there will always be some unfairness in their application.129 It 
is simpler and wiser to leave the estimation of damages, of whatever sort, to the plaintiff and her 
attorney.
Restrictions on the number of experts, elimination or limitation of expert depositions, and 
a shortened time to trial are the common features of tracks one and two. By limiting the number 
of experts to be identified and deposed (or, as in track one, eliminating depositions altogether) 
the amount required for preparing for trial can be reduced dramatically. The minimum amount 
required both to pursue a medical malpractice action, and to defend a medical malpractice action
will be reduced. It makes good sense to do so. The overhead associated with medical malpractice 
litigation- specifically, the amount paid lawyers, experts, economists and others- is famously 
high. The consensus view is that less than 50% of all the money spent by insurers on medical 
malpractice claims ends up in the pockets of injured patients. Most observers estimate that 
between 55% and 60% of all insurer expenditures go for expenses of one kind or another: 
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, defense attorneys’ fees, expert fees, records review, and claims 
administration.130 Much of that money would be better spent compensating more claimants, or 
reducing the insurers’ costs of doing business, or some combination of both. Reducing the 
overhead required will also improve access to the courts. The high fixed costs involved in 
bringing a malpractice lawsuit have the effect of denying access to the courts for many 
claimants, whose claims, otherwise meritorious, are simply “not worth it” in the opinion of 
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counsel.131 Improving access in turn will promote the two fundamental goals of tort law-
compensation and deterrence.
Why $200,000?
Cases in which the plaintiff agrees to limit his or her overall recovery to $200,000 or less 
would be eligible for track one. The logic for using $200,000 as the ceiling for track one is 
simple. The fixed costs of case preparation on the plaintiff’s side for any malpractice claim are 
likely to be at least $50,000.132 Assuming a typical contingency agreement of 33 1/3%, in a  
$200,000 recovery, the plaintiff would receive between $80,000 and $100,000, depending on 
whether the fee is taken against the gross recovery of $200,000, or the net recovery of $150,000 
after costs are recouped. To the extent that costs can be controlled or reduced, the recovery to the 
plaintiff would increase, under either scenario.133
The fact that a patient’s actual injuries might be no more than $100,000 is not a reason to 
deny the patient compensation, from the party responsible for the injury. Only because we are 
accustomed to hearing about much larger medical malpractice verdicts do we think that a less-
than-six figure injury is not substantial. If the context is changed- for example, from medical 
malpractice to a “slip and fall” in a local supermarket, a $100,000 injury seems more impressive.
Much of the overall expense of defending medical malpractice lawsuits can be attributed 
to relatively low-dollar cases. A high percentage of medical malpractice payments are less than 
$200,000. In 2003, for example, 15,291 payments on behalf of physicians were reported to the 
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National Practitioner Data Bank.134 8983 of those payments (58.7%) were in an amount less 
than $200,000.135 The sum of payments of less than $200,000 was approximately $718,928,600, 
representing 16.1% of all payments reported to the Data Bank on behalf of physicians in 2003. 
However, the important number is not the percentage total of all payments reported to the Data 
Bank. Instead, the frequency of these relatively small payments is more significant. For virtually 
every one of these payments,136 a substantial amount of money was likely spent prosecuting and 
defending the claim. For any lawsuit alleging medical malpractice, regardless of the amount the 
plaintiff seeks, there will be substantial expenses that neither side will be able to avoid, such as 
the cost of obtaining and reviewing medical records, the cost of locating and recruiting potential 
experts, and the cost of deposing the experts designated by the other side. On average, defense 
costs will be in excess of $25,000 per case, and in excess of $50,000 for the plaintiff.137 Numbers 
this large should not be ignored. Because of the inevitable fixed costs of record review, expert 
recruitment and depositions, low dollar cases are not necessarily cheaper to defend (or pursue) 
than high dollar cases. Furthermore, given the ways of pre-trial discovery, and the absence of 
limits on the number of experts in particular, a party often has the ability to impose additional 
costs on the opposing party. For example, more experts can be designated than will be needed, 
requiring additional discovery depositions.
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Certainly many, if not most of the low dollar payments reported to the Data Bank 
originated as claims that contemplated significantly higher amounts. Still, the fact remains that in 
the end, the plaintiff and her attorney were willing to accept these relatively modest amounts- for 
better or worse. The point is, that to arrive at even these modest amounts in settlement, a large 
amount of money had to be spent on the costs of defending and prosecuting these cases. The 
money could be better spent elsewhere.138
A Cap on All Damages?
The distinction between economic and non-economic damages is difficult to rationalize. 
Some injuries, even though severe, do not usually lead to significant economic damages.139 Some 
injuries, even though not severe, may often lead to significant economic damages. Unfair results, 
particularly when analyzed in terms of vertical equity, seem inevitable.140 It would be simpler, 
and wiser, to allow plaintiffs to decide how they wish to proceed, in light of their own 
assessment of damages. If the damages do not seem enormous, and the need for a prompt 
resolution is present, then either track one or track two will offer an attractive alternative. 
Otherwise, the plaintiff should be free to seek whatever amount she believes she is entitled to. 
Injecting the distinction between economic and non-economic damages into the process is 
simply not worth the effort.
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What Kinds of Cases?
Payment data from the NPDB offers a glimpse of the types of cases that are likely to fit 
the parameters of track one and track two. Beginning in early 2004, the NPDB began to provide 
data on severity of the injury alleged, using a nine-level scale ranging from “1,” emotional injury 
only, to “9,” death.  Table 2 sets out the number, average and median payments made, by 
severity category. Table 2 also sets out the percentage of cases, within each severity category, in 
which less than $200,000 and $1,000,000, respectively, was paid.
Table 2
Payment by Severity Category
n= 9194
Severity of 
Injury
Number of 
Cases
Average 
Payment
Median 
Payment
Pct. Of Cases 
< $200,000
Pct. Of Cases
< $1,000,000
Emotional 
injury only 
123 $73,502 $37,500 94.3% 0.0%
Insignificant 
injury
162 $65,830 $17,500 92.6% 0.0%
Minor 
temporary 
910 $78.321 $37,500 90.8% 0.2%
Major 
temporary
850 $178,107 $115,000 72.5% 0.4%
Minor 
permanent
1086 $180,666 $97,500 73.0% 0.8%
Significant 
permanent
1441 $339,617 $225,000 46.8% 2.9%
Major 
permanent
949 $478,251 $325,000 32.3% 5.6%
Quadriplegic, 
brain damage, 
lifetime care
471 $800,968 $495,000 5.9% 12.3%
Death 3021 $282,639 $195,000 54.8% 1.4%
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank, Public Use Data File, November 2004.  
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       Emotional injuries, insignificant injuries, and minor temporary injuries seem well-suited for 
track one. Over 90% of the reported awards for these three categories were for less than $200,000. 
Track one might also prove attractive for many major temporary injury and minor permanent injury 
cases. Over 72% of the reported awards for those two categories were for less than $200,000.  
Track two should be attractive to all categories of injury severity, with the exception of 
category 8 (quadriplegic, brain damage, lifetime care), and possibly category 7, major permanent 
injury. Only for level 8 does the percentage of million-dollar cases exceed 10%. Most death 
cases (category 9) should be suitable for either track one or track two. Death cases represent 
almost one-third (3021/9194) of the payments reported for 2004. The average indemnity 
payment for death cases was $282,639. Less than 1.5% of such payments exceeded $1,000,000. 
The choice of what track to use will remain with the plaintiff, of course. 
Nonetheless, the data are suggestive. For most injuries, much time and expense could be saved 
by opting for track one or track two, with little risk of forgoing a larger award
More Lawsuits?
Reducing the overhead associated with medical malpractice litigation cuts both ways, of 
course. If it will cost less to defend a case, it will cost less to prosecute a case. A three track 
system might therefore increase the number of lawsuits filed, at least initially. The increase 
would be most likely for track one cases- i.e., cases in which the plaintiff seeks no more than 
$200,000 in damages. This might well prove to be a benefit to all concerned.
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It is important to understand a potential $200,000 recovery in context. Under current 
practice, even assuming that the full $200,000 is recovered, the plaintiff’s net recovery would 
likely be not much more than $100,000. Assuming a minimum of $50,000 in pre-trial expenses 
that will have to be paid, and assuming a standard contingency fee of 33 1/3 %, at most $83,400
will be left for the plaintiff.141 If the attorneys’ fees are calculated on the basis of net recovery 
(gross recovery, less expenses), the plaintiff’s recovery will be a bit higher- but still no more than
half of the gross amount recovered. If only $100,000 is obtained, the net recovery to the plaintiff 
may well be less than $20,000.142 Furthermore, these examples assume likely liability on the 
part of the physician. If there is a significant chance of no recovery, the dollar value of the 
recovery (if obtained) would need to be higher, to offset the increased risk of recovering nothing. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that cases valued at $200,000 or less are precisely the cases 
that rarely get filed. Given the high rate of under-claiming by victims of medical negligence143
perhaps a higher volume of low stakes litigation is exactly what’s needed. 
More lawsuits may be the way to re-direct medical malpractice litigation to one of the 
fundamental goals of tort law: compensation. More lawsuits might mean more payments to more 
injured people. If such proved to be the case, it would not necessarily mean greater payments 
overall to claimants, due to the effect of the caps agreed to for track one and track two. The result 
instead would be greater horizontal equity among claimants with similar injuries. More 
important, the possibility of more lawsuits would mean greater access to the courts for injured 
patients. At present, for malpractice injuries that cannot be valued in excess of $200,000, access 
to the courts is virtually nonexistent. In order to secure the services of an experienced plaintiff’s 
attorney, the minimum amount is actually much higher. It is important to understand that this 
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problem of very limited access exists even in the absence of caps legislation. When legislatively 
imposed caps are introduced, access to the courts becomes even more constrained.144
For claims valued at more than $200,000 but less than $1,000,000, the availability of 
track two might also increase the number of lawsuits filed. Reducing the number of experts, and 
assuring a resolution of the case within twelve months would lower the costs and the risks of 
bringing a lawsuit. As a result, more economically marginal cases might be filed. Examples 
would include cases in which liability is uncertain or doubtful, but damages, if proved, would
exceed $200,000; or cases in which damages probably exceed $200,000, but realistically are 
worth no more than several hundred thousand dollars. Cases such as these would become more 
attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
In addition to promoting the tort law goal of compensation, an increase in the number 
of lawsuits would promote the goal of deterrence as well, by improving the signaling process. 
When a mistake has been made, followed by an injury, the party allegedly responsible should 
know about it. The party responsible should also know the outcome of the claim. These things 
happen- eventually- under existing practice. But they do not happen in predictable fashion, and 
they do not happen quickly. Instead, most injuries, even injuries caused by error, do not lead to a 
claim, much less a lawsuit.145 When a claim is made, or a lawsuit is filed, resolution of the matter 
is certainly months away, and likely more than two years away.146 When the resolution occurs, it 
will most likely take the form of either a voluntary dismissal (meaning the plaintiff simply 
abandoned the case) or a monetary settlement. Either way, there has been no determination of 
fault made by a court. Rarely is either vindication or condemnation the result for the defendant 
physician. The goal of deterrence goes unserved if the message (either vindication or 
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condemnation) is so seldom sent. Increasing the volume of cases would change this pattern. 
There would be more resolutions of all types, including judgments. Because of the streamlined 
process required for tracks one and two, the outcomes would be known sooner.      
So where is the benefit to defendants? That benefit appears when another result of the 
tracking system is considered: the costs of defending a claim will be reduced, just as the 
plaintiff’s costs of preparing a claim will be reduced. There will be less reason to settle to avoid 
the high costs of trial. In fact, reducing the costs of defense should have the effect of reducing, 
overall, the amount offered by the insurer to settle the case. Reductions in settlement amounts 
would then follow.147
If the case proceeds under either track one or track two, the maximum amount 
recoverable will be within the limits of many, if not most medical liability policies written 
today.148 With the threat of potential personal liability removed, there will be less incentive to 
settle for reasons unrelated to actual fault. In other words, a defendant who genuinely feels she 
has not been negligent will find it easier to resist the temptation to settle, and instead insist on her 
day in court. She will not be risking personal liability for any excess judgment.149
More Trials?
Far more malpractice cases settle than ever go to trial.150 Thus, the effect that a three 
track system would have on trial and settlement rates needs to be considered. There is a 
147Twenty years ago, Danzon ran a number of simulations to determine the effect on medical malpractice litigation 
that a hypothetical 30% reduction in litigation costs for both sides would have. Danzon concluded that such a 
reduction would result in a reduction in average settlement amounts, an increase in the trial rate, and a decrease in 
the number of cases dropped without payment by the plaintiff. DANZON 1985, supra n.16, at 48-49.  
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possibility that more trials would result. The reason for this is that for track one and track two 
cases, insurers will know that their potential exposure is now limited. Freed of the risk of 
excessive awards, insurers might be inclined to offer less than before for the same sort of injury. 
After all, the defense wins much more often than it loses at trial, and everyone knows that.151
Even in the face of the historically long odds that going to trial represents, plaintiffs may still 
conclude that they are better off going to trial. After all, the trial preparation will be less 
expensive than before, and the time to trial has been reduced. Put another way, when the 
transaction costs are reduced, pursuing a case to verdict makes more sense. Plaintiffs will 
discount their claims less, and defendants will make corresponding adjustments to the amount 
they are willing to pay in settlement. 152 Still, going to trial will make sense only if a careful 
analysis of the merits of the case has been done prior to filing the lawsuit.
Just as with an increase in filings, an increase in the trial rate would yield benefits to all. 
There is reason to believe that plaintiffs pay a substantial discount from the value of their claims 
when they agree to settlement.153 The payments reported to the Data Bank support this view. In 
2003, for example, the median award at trial (as reported to the NPDB) was $255,000. In 
contrast, the median settlement amount was $155,000. Even allowing for the savings to be 
expected in not going to trial, the disparity is still striking.154 A similar result can be found at the 
high end of the scale. In 2003, 9.2% of all jury awards were in excess of $1,000,000. Only 2.7% 
of all settlements exceeded $1,000,000. For defendants, the prospect of more trials- conducted 
quickly and at less expense- might be the most efficient way, over time, to discourage frivolous 
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lawsuits. The battle will be over the merits of the claim. The recurring temptation to settle rather 
than incur defense costs that would exceed the likely settlement will be lessened.
Fewer Large Awards
One of the most frequently cited problems with medical malpractice litigation is 
the steady increase in claim severity.155 The trend is especially evident in the past several years. 
The size of payments of all types- judgments and settlements- has increased noticeably.156 The 
use of the three track system should have the effect of reducing the number of awards in excess 
of $1,000,000.The restrictions on the use of experts and the promise of a prompt resolution 
should be enough to lure some cases that might otherwise result in a “runaway” jury award into 
the confines of track two. For example, imagine a case with a likely settlement value of 
$500,000. Under present practice, there is always the possibility that the plaintiff will come away 
with an award far in excess of $500,000- perhaps $1,000,000, perhaps much more. Both sets of 
lawyers will be aware of the possibility of a “jackpot” award. The potential for a very large 
award becomes an argument in favor of settlement, that plaintiff’s counsel is likely to invoke-
sometimes successfully, sometimes not. When plaintiff’s counsel decides to take advantage of 
the benefits of lower pretrial overhead, and shorter time to resolution, the possibility of a very 
large award disappears. In other words, a three track system should have the effect of screening 
out cases that, objectively viewed, are not worth seven figures, but, in the hands of a skilful 
advocate and a sympathetic jury, just might be. At present, there is no reason not to go for the 
jackpot award, at least in the lawsuit’s early stages. With a three track system in place, there will 
be good reasons to refrain from going for the jackpot award. Since jury verdicts provide the key 
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reference point for settlements,157 restraining the amount of jury verdicts will have a moderating 
effect on settlement amounts as well.
Longer Term Effects
Use of a three track system would have two beneficial effects, with respect to the 
behavior of plaintiff’s counsel. First, the availability of different tracks will encourage counsel to 
value their cases realistically, from the start of the representation. It will make little sense to 
“default” to track three for a case truly worth no more than $200,000; the result will be needless 
delay and expense. Realistic case evaluation, early in the representation, should have the effect 
of correcting inflated expectations that the client may have- expectations that may make a 
settlement harder to obtain later in the development of the case, when the weaknesses of the case 
become apparent. Second, the availability of different tracks means that counsel will need to 
discuss the filing options with the client. That will mean explaining the benefits and the 
disadvantages of a less expensive, speedier resolution. It should also mean that plaintiffs will 
assume a greater say in the prosecution of their claims. They will need to decide whether a 
prompt resolution, with limited expense but bounded by a voluntary cap on damages is more 
desirable than an opportunity, however slight, to recover a larger sum, with the attendant higher 
expenses and greater time to resolution. At present, plaintiffs do not have to make this 
determination, even though in many cases an award of less than $1,000,000, or even less than 
$200,000, would adequately compensate them for their injury.
157
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Large Dollar Cases: Track Three
Of course, there will be cases where the amount of potential damages is truly in excess 
of $1,000,000. There will also be very complex cases which, in the opinion of plaintiff’s counsel, 
require the use of multiple experts. Nonetheless, there should not be many such cases. 
First of all, a review of reports to the NPDB since 1990 shows that payments of any type 
in excess of $1,000,000 are quite uncommon; judgments in excess of $1,000,000 are more 
uncommon still. In 2003, 97.1% (14,851 out of 15,296) of all payments were for $1,000,000 or 
less.158 Such payments accounted for 79.6% of all the payments reported to the Data Bank for 
2003. Of those payments, 426 represented jury verdicts; only 43 judgments in excess of 
$1,000,000 were reported to the Data Bank in 2003. Even allowing for the recent increase in 
severity of indemnity payments, these numbers indicate that very large payments still remain 
very much the rare exception to a more moderate pattern. In any event, the fact that the median 
and mean awards are increasing in amount is all the more reason to provide incentives not to 
seek such large amounts, except when plainly warranted. Voluntary caps can provide such an 
incentive.
Second, it needs to be understood that true multi-million claims will often, of necessity, 
involve defendants other than a physician or two. Hospitals will likely be co-defendants. The 
reason for this is pragmatic. The most common liability limits for a medical malpractice policy 
are $1,000,000 per event, and $3,000,000 per year.159 Deeper pockets will be needed, in other 
words. Yet once hospitals become critical (if not primary) defendants, the policy issues change. 
No longer is the concern, necessarily, driving individual physicians out of practice. It is easy 
enough to rally political support for Dr. Marcus Welby; it is a more difficult task to rally political 
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support for a faceless medical center. Even more important, it is at the institutional level that 
deterrence might actually work- not with individual physicians.160 We should aim the cannon in 
that direction, then.
Effects on Settlement
It is widely understood that in order to settle a lawsuit for, say, $500,000 the plaintiff 
must begin by demanding a much higher number, perhaps even higher than $1,000,000. This is a 
key feature of the process of positional negotiation that most lawyers use.161 If the maximum 
award is now capped at $1,000,000, how does the settlement dance change? Realistically, an 
experienced plaintiff’s lawyer would agree to a $1,000,000 cap only if the true “goal” is 
considerably less than $1,000,000- and so the defense will assume. Room must be left for the 
plaintiff to make concessions. For similar reasons, an insurer wishing to initiate settlement talks 
will begin with an offer considerably less than the amount it is willing to pay- and so the 
plaintiff’s lawyer will assume.
Does this mean that in practice, a $1,000,000 voluntary cap will attract only claims 
valued by the plaintiff’s lawyer as worth, say, no more than $500,000? That would be an 
unfortunate result, because it would mean that fewer cases are being “captured” by this second 
track. In effect, it would mean a de facto cap of no more than $500,000 - $600,000, where 
perhaps a net of $350,000, at most, goes to the injured patient.162 It doesn’t have to be this way.
A three-track system would change the traditional choreography of the settlement dance.
The effect of choosing track one or track two will be to reduce the time to trial to twelve months 
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or less. The parties will have to make a choice: either bargain realistically, or go to trial. In a 
system where trial is never more than twelve months away, the opportunity (and incentive) for 
posturing and intransigence will be lessened. Knowing that a bluff can be called in short order, 
there should be less temptation to do so in the first place. Use of a three track system would place 
the emphasis in case resolution where it ought to be: on the merits.163
A larger question regarding settlement must also be considered, however. Most medical 
malpractice lawsuits are disposed of in one of two ways. Either they are abandoned unilaterally, 
or they are settled. The settlement rate for medical malpractice cases is much higher than the trial 
rate. Various studies have estimated the settlement rate, for filed cases, at around 50%.164 In 
contrast, the trial rate is estimated at between 5.8%165 and 11%.166 Would fewer cases settle, 
under a three-track system?
Perhaps so. Twenty years ago, Danzon concluded that a 30% reduction in litigation costs 
for both sides would result in more trials, and fewer cases dropped without payment.167 The 
effect would be temporary, however. Over time, lawyers will learn what suits not to bring. A 
three track system rewards plaintiffs’ lawyers who are adept at picking cases that have real value,
by reducing both the overhead and the carrying costs associated with malpractice litigation. The 
system punishes insurers who refuse to settle cases that should be settled. Under tracks one and 
two, the incentive for delay is diminished, since a prompt trial is assured. The opportunity to 
settle on terms more favorable than trial will still exist, but with a trial in the near future, the 
163
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opportunity will be shorter. In the end, the result will be a more efficient and more rational 
system.
One other benefit to a three track system should not go overlooked. This proposal 
can be implemented without enabling legislation. All it takes is a willingness to experiment on 
the part of one or more insurers, at least some plaintiffs’ attorneys, and the local trial courts. The 
details could be expressed in nothing more elaborate than a discovery scheduling order. Samples
of such orders appear in the appendix.
Conclusion
A three track system will not, of itself, cure the medical malpractice insurance crisis. A 
true cure will require changes much larger than what is proposed here. Nonetheless, it is a start. 
Precisely because the changes that will be required will be substantial, it is unrealistic to think 
that they can be adopted with one bold step. When it comes to malpractice reform, we need to 
learn how to crawl before we can learn how to walk. 
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED EXPEDITED DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER
(Track One Cases)
THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the undersigned presiding Judge, on the date 
indicated below, and the Court hereby finding that this is an action alleging medical malpractice; 
that the parties wish to bring this action to a prompt resolution, and in any event within nine 
months of the date indicated below;
and that the parties have agreed that in no event shall the amount of money awarded or paid to 
the plaintiff exceed $200,000;
the Court therefore finds that it would be in the best interest of justice for an Expedited 
Scheduling and Pre-trial Order to be entered.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED  that the parties to 
this action shall comply with the following Order:
[ASSUME, for illustration purposes, that the date of the order is January 1]
1. The parties shall each be limited to designating a single expert witness.
2. On or before March 1, the Plaintiff shall identify the expert witness s/he intends to call at the 
trial of this action. 
3. On or before April 1, the Defendant shall identify the expert witness s/he intends to call at the
trial of this action. 
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4. As used in this Order, the term “identify” when used in the context of expert witnesses shall 
mean the furnishing of the following information about each such expert:
(a) name and address
(b) training and qualifications (or curriculum vitae)
(c) a detailed statement setting forth the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to 
testify; a detailed statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; 
and the basis for each opinion, including medical records, deposition testimony, and any other 
materials the expert has reviewed.
5. All discovery of any nature and description whatsoever shall be concluded on or before 
August 1. This case shall be set for trial to begin on or before October 1.
6. Any expert witness not identified in conformity with this Order shall not be permitted to 
testify at the trial of this action. The testimony of all expert witnesses shall be limited to the 
information specified in paragraph 4(c) of this Order.
7. The parties agree that in no event shall an amount in excess of $200,000, including both 
economic and non-economic damages as well as attorneys fees and pre-judgment interest, be 
paid to the Plaintiff, whether in settlement or as a result of a jury verdict. In the event of an
award in excess of $200,000, the plaintiff agrees to accept a reduction in the amount of the award 
to $200,000. The parties further agree that in no event will punitive damages be sought or 
awarded. 
8. Plaintiff agrees to authorize the release of any and all medical records of the plaintiff within 
one week of the date of this Order.
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9. The parties agree that the right of the parties to appeal an adverse judgment or other 
dispositive ruling shall be unaffected by this order.
10. This Order may be modified by written agreement of all parties.
So ordered, this the 1st day of January, 20__.
_____________
Judge
CONSENTED TO:
[attorney for plaintiff]
[attorney for defendant]
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PROPOSED EXPEDITED DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER
(Track Two Cases)
THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the undersigned presiding Judge, on the date 
indicated below, and the Court hereby finding that this is an action alleging medical malpractice; 
that the parties wish to bring this action to a prompt resolution, and in any event within twelve 
months of the date indicated below;
And that the parties have agreed that in no event shall the amount of money awarded or paid to 
the plaintiff exceed $1,000,000;
the Court therefore finds that it would be in the best interest of justice for an Expedited 
Scheduling and Pre-Trial Order to be entered.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties to 
this action shall comply with the following order:
[Assume, for illustration purposes, that the date of the order is January 1]
1. The parties shall each be limited to designating no more than two expert witnesses.
2. On or before March 1, the plaintiff shall identify the expert witnesses s/he intends to call at the 
trial of this action. By March 15, the plaintiff shall make such expert witnesses available for any 
discovery depositions the defendant may wish to conduct. 
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3. On or before May 1, the defendant shall identify the expert witnesses s/he intends to call at the 
trial of this action. By June 15, the defendant shall make such expert witnesses available for any 
discovery depositions the plaintiff may wish to conduct.
4. As used in this Order, the term “identify” when used in the context of expert witnesses shall 
mean the furnishing of the following information about each such expert:
(a) name and address;
(b) training and qualifications (or curriculum vitae);
(c) a statement setting forth the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify, a 
summary of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; and the basis for 
each opinion, including medical records, deposition testimony, and any other materials the expert 
has reviewed.
5. All discovery of any nature and description whatsoever shall be concluded on or before 
October 1. This case shall be set for trial to begin on or before December 1.
6. Any expert witness not identified in conformity with this Order shall not be permitted to 
testify at the trial of this action. 
7. The parties agree that in no event shall an amount in excess of $1,000,000, including both 
economic and non-economic damages as well as attorneys fees and pre-judgment interest, be 
paid to the plaintiff, whether in settlement or as a result of a verdict. In the event of an award in 
excess of $1,000,000, the plaintiff agrees to accept a reduction in the amount of the award to 
$1,000,000. The parties further agree that in no event will punitive damages be sought or 
awarded.
8. Plaintiff agrees to authorize the release of any and all medical records of the plaintiff within 
one week of the date of this Order.
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9. The parties agree that the right of the parties to appeal an adverse judgment or other 
dispositive ruling shall be unaffected by this Order.
10. This Order may be modified by written agreement of all parties.
So ordered, this the 1st day of January, 20__.
__________
Judge
CONSENTED TO:
[attorney for the plaintiff]
[attorney for the defendant]
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